ci-score
Audited by Socket on Aug 10, 2026
3 alerts found:
Anomalyx3No explicit malware behavior is evident in this workflow fragment (no exfiltration/backdoor primitives). However, it has meaningful supply-chain and operational risk: it extracts an unverified tar archive from prior workflow artifacts into a writable directory and then performs privileged recursive ownership changes, then re-packages and re-uploads the resulting cache for future runs. If the artifact contents or referenced third-party actions were compromised, this could allow tampering to influence Renovate’s execution environment. Recommendation: add integrity verification for cache artifacts (e.g., signing/hashes), harden tar extraction (defensive options and member validation), and prefer commit-pinning for all third-party actions.
No direct malicious behavior is observable in the workflow YAML itself. However, the workflow is security-sensitive: it uses an internal authentication action with a private key to mint a token that requests write and administration capabilities, then executes an unprovided local Node sync script with that token. It also performs runtime dependency installation without a lockfile and with trust checks disabled, increasing supply-chain integrity risk. The highest confidence gap is the content of the local auth action and the sync script; these should be reviewed to rule out sabotage, privilege misuse, or data exfiltration.
No explicit malicious logic is present in the shown YAML; it is largely standard CI wiring. However, it materially increases supply-chain and credential-misuse risk by (1) executing untrusted PR repository scripts during pnpm install/build, (2) dynamically executing a remotely fetched publisher via pnpm dlx, and (3) exposing a secret (TURBO_TOKEN) and telemetry endpoint to all invoked tooling in the workflow. The publish command appears truncated, preventing full verification of publishing destinations/authentication. Overall: elevated supply-chain risk requiring deeper inspection of repo build scripts and the dlx-fetched publish tool (pinning/provenance and secret handling), and gating publishing to trusted contexts.