ci-speedup
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted job logs from GitHub Actions runs during the Phase 4a 'LLM gap-fill' process. This creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection attacks where malicious content in the logs could attempt to influence the agent's behavior during analysis.\n
- Ingestion points: Job logs are fetched by
collect_runs.pyand provided to the agent for analysis in Phase 4a.\n - Boundary markers: Explicit instructions are present in
SKILL.mdandreferences/gap-fill.mddirecting the agent to treat log content as untrusted data and ignore any instructions or directives embedded within them.\n - Capability inventory: The agent executes scripts such as
run.pyandcollect_runs.pywhich utilizesubprocess.runto callgitand theghCLI.\n - Sanitization: The skill provides instructions for the agent to manually mask credentials, but there is no automated sanitization of ingested logs implemented in the code.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs shell command execution using the
ghandgitCLIs to inspect the repository and fetch Actions data. These operations are core functionality for the skill but involve parameters derived from repository metadata.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches data from GitHub APIs via theghCLI. This is a trusted and well-known service necessary for the primary purpose of the skill.
Audit Metadata