json-to-markdown-files
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a shell command to execute a local Node.js script with a user-provided file path. If the path variable is not properly sanitized by the platform, it could lead to arbitrary shell command injection.
- Evidence: SKILL.md contains the instruction
node scripts/extract-data.js "<json-file-path>". - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/extract-data.jsis vulnerable to path traversal during file creation. It uses keys directly from the input JSON to construct file paths without validation, allowing a malicious JSON to write files outside the intended directory. - Evidence:
const outputPath = path.join(jsonFileDir,${key}.md);inscripts/extract-data.js. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent not to read the content of the files it is processing, which could be an attempt to bypass agent-side safety inspections of large or malicious payloads.
- Evidence: SKILL.md states '禁止读取文件的具体内容, 因为文件通常很大' (Prohibit reading the specific content of the file, because files are usually large).
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect Prompt Injection Surface. The skill processes untrusted external JSON data and uses it to drive file system operations without sanitization.
- Ingestion points:
fs.readFile(jsonFilePath, "utf8")inscripts/extract-data.js. - Boundary markers: None present in the instructions or script.
- Capability inventory: Shell command execution (
RunCommand) and file system write access (fs.writeFile). - Sanitization: No validation or escaping is performed on the keys or values extracted from the JSON file.
Audit Metadata