codex-first

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 1, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill mandates the use of the codex exec --yolo command pattern. The --yolo flag enables the Codex CLI to automatically execute shell commands generated by the AI model without requiring user confirmation or review for each step.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: Instructions in SKILL.md and references/resume-and-watchdog.md explicitly require the agent to use the --dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox flag during session resumption. This flag is designed to remove built-in security boundaries and bypass safety approval prompts within the Codex execution environment.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates a workflow where a remote AI model (Codex) generates and executes code directly on the local host. By disabling sandboxing and approval gates, the skill provides a direct path for the model to perform arbitrary operations on the system.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The references/launch-details.md file provides instructions to install the Codex CLI by fetching a shell script from OpenAI's official domain using curl -fsSL https://chatgpt.com/codex/install.sh | sh. This facilitates the installation of the primary external dependency required for the skill's operation.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents a large attack surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: The skill is designed to process external and untrusted data including repository source code, dependency logs, bug reports, and work orders to generate tasks for the Codex worker.
  • Boundary markers: The prompt contract described in SKILL.md does not define specific delimiters or boundary markers to prevent instructions within the processed data from being interpreted as commands by the model.
  • Capability inventory: The skill grants the worker full shell command execution privileges, file system access, and the ability to manage system processes (using kill and pgrep via the codex-resume script).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the input data before it is interpolated into the work orders sent to the Codex CLI.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Nov 1, 2026, 07:08 AM