project-structure
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The script dynamically loads a Node.js module from a path constructed from user-supplied input.
- Evidence: In
map.ts, the functionloadTypescript(repoRoot)attempts to load thetypescriptpackage from the target project usingcreateRequire(join(repoRoot, 'package.json'))('typescript'). - Risk: An attacker could distribute a repository containing a malicious module at
node_modules/typescript. If a user analyzes this repository using the skill, the malicious code would be executed during the mapping process. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted source code and presents it to an LLM, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill recursively reads the content of all source files in the target repository using
walk()andreadFileSync()inmap.ts. - Boundary markers: The resulting output uses simple file and directory headers but lacks robust delimiters or explicit instructions for the agent to ignore commands that might be embedded in the code symbols.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to traverse the filesystem and write the output map to a file (
project-structure-map.txt). - Sanitization: While the script squashes whitespace and caps the length of signatures to fit context windows, it does not sanitize or escape content to prevent an LLM from interpreting instructions hidden within the source code.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation provides instructions to execute shell commands using node or package runners.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdinstructs the user to run the mapper usingnode <this-skill-dir>/map.tsornpx tsx. - Context: These are standard operating procedures for the skill's primary utility and involve execution of the skill's own provided scripts.
Audit Metadata