video-transcript-downloader
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill fetches video transcripts from external sources (YouTube and other sites) and prints them to the agent's context. This presents a surface for indirect prompt injection if a video author includes malicious instructions in the subtitles.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/vtd.jsfetches transcripts via theyoutube-transcript-pluslibrary andyt-dlpsubtitle downloads. - Boundary markers: No boundary markers or "ignore instructions" wrappers are used when printing the transcript content to stdout.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands (
yt-dlp,ffmpeg) and write files to the local file system (outputDir). - Sanitization: The script performs basic cleaning of HTML tags and bracketed cues (e.g.,
[Music]), but does not sanitize the content for potential AI instructions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
vtd.jsscript allows forwarding arbitrary arguments to theyt-dlpbinary using the--separator. While it usesspawnwith an argument array to prevent shell injection,yt-dlpitself contains flags (such as--exec) that allow for arbitrary command execution. If an agent is influenced to use these flags, it could lead to unauthorized system access. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill is designed to download content from remote URLs provided by the user or agent, utilizing the
youtube-transcript-pluspackage and theyt-dlpcommand-line utility. These operations are essential to the skill's primary purpose.
Audit Metadata