video-transcript-downloader
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/vtd.jsfile implements a passthrough mechanism using the--argument. This feature forwards all subsequent arguments directly to theyt-dlpsubprocess execution. - Evidence: The
parseArgsfunction captures arguments after--intoopts.extra, which are then spread into thespawnarguments foryt-dlpin various command functions. - Risk: A malicious actor or a manipulated agent could include flags like
--exec <command>, which is a nativeyt-dlpfeature that executes arbitrary shell commands after a download completes. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The primary purpose of the skill is to fetch video transcripts and subtitles from external sources and present them as a clean paragraph to the agent.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/vtd.jsusesyoutube-transcript-plusandyt-dlpto fetch remote content. - Capability inventory: The skill has file-system write access and the ability to execute subprocesses.
- Risk: This creates an indirect prompt injection surface where instructions hidden within video subtitles (attacker-controlled external data) are ingested into the agent's context and could influence its subsequent actions.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill depends on external Node.js packages and requires the presence of third-party binaries on the host system.
- Evidence:
package.jsonincludesyoutube-transcript-plus.SKILL.mdinstructs the user to installyt-dlpandffmpegvia Homebrew.
Audit Metadata