skills/steipete/openclaw/bear-notes/Gen Agent Trust Hub

bear-notes

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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 13, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill metadata specifies the installation of the grizzly utility using go install github.com/tylerwince/grizzly/cmd/grizzly@latest. This downloads and compiles source code from a third-party repository not associated with a known trusted organization.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell commands to interface with the Bear application via the grizzly binary, including the use of pipes and input redirections for note creation and modification.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill instructions direct the user to store a Bear API token in a configuration file at ~/.config/grizzly/token. The tool subsequently reads from this sensitive file path for authentication.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the ingestion of external data from Bear notes into the agent's context, which presents a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Data is retrieved via grizzly open-note and grizzly tags commands.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to treat note content as untrusted data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill includes capabilities to create, append to, and search notes using shell command execution.
  • Sanitization: The skill does not implement sanitization or validation of the content retrieved from Bear before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 13, 2026, 02:11 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — bear-notes