coding-agent
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 13, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains explicit instructions to bypass safety and permission constraints. It commands the agent to use the
--permission-mode bypassPermissionsflag for Claude Code and the--yoloflag for Codex, which is described in the text as "No sandbox, no approvals." - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions define and utilize a
bashtool that includes anelevatedparameter. This parameter is described as allowing the agent to "Run on host instead of sandbox," which significantly escalates the risk of unauthorized system access and manipulation. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides examples of running arbitrary shell commands within repository environments, such as
pnpm install. This practice is risky as it can trigger the execution of arbitrary lifecycle scripts defined in a project's dependencies. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's configuration includes the installation of external Node.js packages such as
@anthropic-ai/claude-codeand@openai/codex. Additionally, the documentation suggests installing@mariozechner/pi-coding-agentvianpm install -g. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill implements a custom notification system using
openclaw message send. This mechanism is designed to transmit status updates to external channels, which could potentially be misused to exfiltrate sensitive information if the routing parameters (channel, target) are pointed to attacker-controlled endpoints.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata