gog
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on shell commands executed via the
gogutility to interact with Google Workspace APIs. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill configuration automates the installation of the
gogclitool from the author's Homebrew tap (steipete/tap/gogcli). This is a resource owned by the skill author. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface as it is designed to ingest and process untrusted external content from Google Workspace.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through commands like
gog gmail search,gog drive search,gog docs cat, andgog sheets get(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not provide explicit boundary markers or warnings to ignore instructions embedded within retrieved emails or documents.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to perform sensitive actions based on processed data, such as sending emails (
gog gmail send), creating calendar events (gog calendar create), and updating spreadsheets (gog sheets update). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the retrieved content is described in the provided instructions.
Audit Metadata