code-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data in the form of git diffs and project file contents, which are then used as input for five different analysis agents.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads input from
git diff,git diff --cached, and direct file reads via theReadandGlobtools in Step 2 and Step 3. - Boundary markers: The prompts for the sub-agents (e.g., Agents 1-5 in Step 3) interpolate the
{diff}and{claude_md_contents}variables directly into the instruction strings without explicit delimiters or instructions for the sub-agents to ignore instructions embedded within the diff code. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses the
Edittool capability to automatically modify files (Step 5) and can execute shell commands viagitandghtools (Step 1, Step 3 Agents 3 and 4). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or filtering of the external code diffs before they are presented to the LLM-based sub-agents.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing various local development tools to perform its primary function.
- Evidence: The workflow involves executing
git diff,git remote show origin,git blame,git log, and variousgh(GitHub CLI) commands includinggh pr view,gh pr list, andgh apito retrieve repository metadata and history.
Audit Metadata