gog-cli
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is entirely built around executing the
gogCLI tool to interact with Google services. It provides instructions for the agent to run shell commands that can perform sensitive operations, including adding Gmail forwarding addresses, managing account delegates, sharing Drive files with external emails, and performing batch deletions of messages. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it allows the agent to ingest and process data from untrusted external sources (emails, documents, chat messages) while maintaining powerful capabilities to act on that data.
- Ingestion points: The agent can read untrusted content via
gog gmail thread get(references/gmail.md),gog chat messages list(references/chat.md),gog docs cat(references/docs-slides.md), andgog sheets get(references/sheets.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define any delimiters or warnings to help the agent distinguish between its system instructions and instructions potentially embedded within the data it reads.
- Capability inventory: The skill provides commands for
gog gmail send,gog gmail forwarding add,gog gmail delegates add,gog drive share,gog drive delete, andgog classroom coursework createacross its reference files. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitization, validation, or escaping of the external content before it is processed or used in subsequent commands.
Audit Metadata