video-walkthrough

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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The scripts/narrate.mjs script dynamically imports a JavaScript module from a file path passed as a command-line argument. While used to load the required TTS library, this pattern of loading code from a computed path is a security surface.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes ffmpeg and ffprobe using the execFileSync method. In scripts/assemble.mjs, the command arguments, including video metadata and captions, are constructed using strings derived from user-provided JSON files.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data from scenes.json and timeline.json to generate narration audio and video overlays. This ingestion of untrusted data into prompts (via TTS) and command-line tools (via metadata) represents a vulnerability surface. Current sanitization is limited to basic escaping for FFmpeg metadata.
  • Ingestion points: scenes.json (read in narrate.mjs), timeline.json (read in assemble.mjs).
  • Boundary markers: None; the scripts parse raw JSON fields.
  • Capability inventory: execFileSync (ffmpeg, ffprobe), file system writes (writeFile), and dynamic module loading (import).
  • Sanitization: assemble.mjs includes a helper function to escape newlines and specific characters (\\, =, ;, #) for FFmpeg metadata output.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill is designed to download the kokoro-js package from npm and model resources from HuggingFace during its setup process.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 1, 2026, 01:48 PM