video-walkthrough
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/narrate.mjsscript dynamically imports a JavaScript module from a file path passed as a command-line argument. While used to load the required TTS library, this pattern of loading code from a computed path is a security surface. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes
ffmpegandffprobeusing theexecFileSyncmethod. Inscripts/assemble.mjs, the command arguments, including video metadata and captions, are constructed using strings derived from user-provided JSON files. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data from
scenes.jsonandtimeline.jsonto generate narration audio and video overlays. This ingestion of untrusted data into prompts (via TTS) and command-line tools (via metadata) represents a vulnerability surface. Current sanitization is limited to basic escaping for FFmpeg metadata. - Ingestion points:
scenes.json(read innarrate.mjs),timeline.json(read inassemble.mjs). - Boundary markers: None; the scripts parse raw JSON fields.
- Capability inventory:
execFileSync(ffmpeg, ffprobe), file system writes (writeFile), and dynamic module loading (import). - Sanitization:
assemble.mjsincludes a helper function to escape newlines and specific characters (\\,=,;,#) for FFmpeg metadata output. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill is designed to download the
kokoro-jspackage from npm and model resources from HuggingFace during its setup process.
Audit Metadata