laravel-mcp
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions specify the installation of the
laravel/boostpackage using Composer (composer require laravel/boost --dev). This adds an external dependency that is not a standard component of the core Laravel framework. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The installation process involves executing shell commands via the Laravel CLI (
php artisan boost:install), which is standard for Laravel package setup but constitutes local command execution initiated by the skill instructions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The code examples in
SKILL.mdcreate a surface for indirect prompt injection by processing untrusted or external data and interpolating it directly into prompts for the AI agent. - Ingestion points: The
AnalyzePostclass (SKILL.md) retrievestitleandcontentfields from thePostmodel to build a prompt. TheSearchUserstool ingests aquerystring to perform database lookups. - Boundary markers: The
AnalyzePost::executemethod lacks delimiters (e.g., XML tags or Markdown blocks) to isolate the retrieved database content from the system instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill provides the agent with capabilities to perform database queries (
DB::table('users')) and read model resources (Post::with('user')). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the
post->contentbefore it is passed to the AI model in theAnalyzePosttool.
Audit Metadata