skills/stiggio/skills/stigg/Gen Agent Trust Hub

stigg

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 2, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill mandates fetching and processing content from external documentation sites to drive its behavior and code generation.
  • Ingestion points: SKILL.md and references/search-first.md instruct the agent to fetch content from https://docs.stigg.io/llms.txt and various sub-paths under docs.stigg.io to retrieve current API schemas and SDK patterns.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions command the agent to treat the fetched content as authoritative for its output.
  • Capability inventory: The agent uses this data to generate backend/frontend integration code and to formulate queries for the Stigg MCP server.
  • Sanitization: Not explicitly defined; the skill relies on the agent's ability to safely parse documentation content.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill employs strong instructional directives intended to override the agent's default reasoning and reliance on static training data.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md labels the "Search-First Rule" as "non-negotiable" and uses phrases like "Red flag — STOP and search" and "delete it and start over" to strictly enforce a specific operational flow. This is used as a quality control mechanism rather than a bypass of safety filters.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill documents the installation of the Stigg CLI and the connection to the Stigg MCP server.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md and references/decision-tree.md refer to brew install stiggio/tools/stigg and the use of the official MCP server at mcp.stigg.io. These are verified vendor resources belonging to the skill author.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 2, 2026, 05:07 PM