stigg
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill mandates fetching and processing content from external documentation sites to drive its behavior and code generation.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.mdandreferences/search-first.mdinstruct the agent to fetch content fromhttps://docs.stigg.io/llms.txtand various sub-paths underdocs.stigg.ioto retrieve current API schemas and SDK patterns. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions command the agent to treat the fetched content as authoritative for its output.
- Capability inventory: The agent uses this data to generate backend/frontend integration code and to formulate queries for the Stigg MCP server.
- Sanitization: Not explicitly defined; the skill relies on the agent's ability to safely parse documentation content.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill employs strong instructional directives intended to override the agent's default reasoning and reliance on static training data.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdlabels the "Search-First Rule" as "non-negotiable" and uses phrases like "Red flag — STOP and search" and "delete it and start over" to strictly enforce a specific operational flow. This is used as a quality control mechanism rather than a bypass of safety filters. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill documents the installation of the Stigg CLI and the connection to the Stigg MCP server.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdandreferences/decision-tree.mdrefer tobrew install stiggio/tools/stiggand the use of the official MCP server atmcp.stigg.io. These are verified vendor resources belonging to the skill author.
Audit Metadata