electron-sveltekit
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill metadata attributes authorship to 'gentleman-programming', which contradicts the identified author 'stolinski'. This discrepancy in provenance documentation can mislead users regarding the origin and maintenance of the code.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The IPC handlers in 'main/ipc/handlers.ts' execute file system operations using parameters directly from the renderer process.
- Evidence: The 'file:read' and 'file:write' handlers pass the 'path' argument directly to Node.js 'fs.readFile' and 'fs.writeFile' without validation or restriction to an allowed directory, permitting access to any file the user can reach.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The IPC bridge establishes an attack surface where untrusted data processed by the renderer could trigger powerful system capabilities.
- Ingestion points: 'window.electron.invoke' calls within 'renderer/src/lib/electron/ipc.svelte.ts'.
- Boundary markers: Absent. The implementation lacks markers or instructions to prevent the agent from executing commands embedded in processed data.
- Capability inventory: File reading (fs.readFile), file writing (fs.writeFile), native file dialogs (dialog.showOpenDialog), and persistent storage access (electron-store) in 'main/ipc/handlers.ts'.
- Sanitization: Absent. The bridge does not validate paths or sanitize the content of file operations.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill implements an automated update mechanism that fetches external code.
- Evidence: 'main/services/updater.ts' configures the 'electron-updater' package to manage application updates. While a standard feature, it represents a path for external code entry.
Audit Metadata