audio-jingle

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 28, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary workflow involves building and executing a shell command that incorporates multiple user-controlled or project-defined variables.
  • Evidence: In Step 3 of SKILL.md, the skill executes node "$OD_BIN" media generate using variables such as --model, --voice, and --prompt which are sourced from external metadata or user input.
  • Risk: There is no evidence of sanitization or parameterization of these inputs. An attacker providing a malicious prompt or metadata value (e.g., containing ;, $(...), or `) could achieve arbitrary command execution on the host system.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection through project metadata.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads audioKind, audioModel, audioDuration, and voice from project metadata in Step 0.
  • Boundary markers: No boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the processing logic.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to a subprocess execution tool (node command).
  • Sanitization: The instructions explicitly tell the agent to use values from metadata "verbatim," which bypasses safety validation and directly introduces untrusted content into the execution pipeline.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Jun 28, 2026, 12:08 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — audio-jingle