audio-jingle
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 28, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary workflow involves building and executing a shell command that incorporates multiple user-controlled or project-defined variables.
- Evidence: In Step 3 of
SKILL.md, the skill executesnode "$OD_BIN" media generateusing variables such as--model,--voice, and--promptwhich are sourced from external metadata or user input. - Risk: There is no evidence of sanitization or parameterization of these inputs. An attacker providing a malicious prompt or metadata value (e.g., containing
;,$(...), or`) could achieve arbitrary command execution on the host system. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection through project metadata.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads
audioKind,audioModel,audioDuration, andvoicefrom project metadata in Step 0. - Boundary markers: No boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the processing logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to a subprocess execution tool (
nodecommand). - Sanitization: The instructions explicitly tell the agent to use values from metadata "verbatim," which bypasses safety validation and directly introduces untrusted content into the execution pipeline.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata