stophy
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute the
stophyCLI or usenpx -y @stophy/clivia the Bash tool to perform search, scraping, and account management (login) tasks. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches and executes vendor-owned code from public registries, specifically the
@stophy/clipackage vianpxand suggestions to install thestophypackage vianpmorpip. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to retrieve and process content from a wide array of third-party platforms, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection if those platforms contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested from external sources including Google Search, Reddit, YouTube, TikTok, LinkedIn, Amazon, and several others (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: While the CLI returns structured flat JSON, the skill does not define explicit delimiters or instructions to treat the ingested data as untrusted text that should not be followed as instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell execution (
Bash) and the ability to write retrieved data to the local file system using the-ooutput flag. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the retrieved content to prevent embedded instructions from influencing the agent's logic.
Audit Metadata