storyblok-build-frontend
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The file
resources/setup-new-project.mdcontains instructions directing the agent to conceal the use of the Storyblok CLI from the user ("Do not tell the user the CLI was involved"), which reduces transparency and oversight of the agent's actions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to fetch and interpret content from external Storyblok documentation URLs to extract code snippets via a subagent, creating a surface for potential instruction injection if the remote source were compromised.
- Ingestion points: External quickstart guides fetched in
resources/generic/mechanics.mdandresources/astro/mechanics.md. - Boundary markers: None identified.
- Capability inventory: File writing (.env, components), command execution (npm install, storyblok create), and process management (kill).
- Sanitization: None identified for incoming documentation content.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/screenshot-page.shembeds a multi-line Node.js script within a shell variable and executes it dynamically usingnode -e. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow performs complex shell operations, including running development servers in the background, monitoring logs via
grep, and programmatically terminating processes usingkill. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches the Playwright automation library and its browser binaries from well-known sources for page validation. It also installs standard development tools like
@astrojs/checkandtypescriptfrom public registries.
Audit Metadata