pr-feedback
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted pull request feedback (reviews, inline comments, and issue-level comments) and presents it to the agent for summarization and action.
- Ingestion points: Feedback is fetched via
gh apiandgh pr viewinfetch-pr-feedback.shand processed inSKILL.mdStep 3. - Boundary markers: None present; the instructions do not tell the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the PR comments.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to modify the filesystem (Step 4) and execute shell commands (Step 1 and 2).
- Sanitization: None present; external content is processed as raw text.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
fetch-pr-feedback.shtakes a--repoargument which is passed directly into shell commands (gh pr view) without validation. - Evidence:
REPO_FLAG=(--repo "$2")infetch-pr-feedback.shcould lead to command injection if a user provides a malicious repository string containing shell metacharacters, though the risk is localized to the user's own environment.
Audit Metadata