speckit-specify
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from multiple sources including user-provided arguments and local project configuration files without sufficient boundary markers or sanitization instructions.
- Ingestion points: Reads from
$ARGUMENTS,.specify/extensions.yml,.specify/init-options.json, and.specify/memory/constitution.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill interpolates user input and project data directly into its processing flow without delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: Includes directory creation (
mkdir), file writing (spec.md,feature.json,requirements.md), and triggering other agent commands viaEXECUTE_COMMAND. - Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of escaping or filtering logic for the ingested external content.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
EXECUTE_COMMAND:trigger to invoke other slash commands (e.g.,/speckit-git-commit) defined within the.specify/extensions.ymlfile. This allows project-level configuration to orchestrate agent behavior and trigger external tooling actions. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The extension hook mechanism dynamically constructs slash commands at runtime by transforming hook names from a YAML configuration (e.g., converting dots to hyphens). This dynamic assembly and subsequent execution of commands creates a flexible but less predictable execution environment.
Audit Metadata