sprint-dev
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill uses dynamic execution techniques to resolve configurations and board-specific settings. It executes the output of a shell script using 'eval' in Phase 0.5 and Phase 1.1 when processing Trello boards.
- Evidence:
eval "$("$CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT/scripts/for-each-board.sh" "[$board_json]")". - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes dynamic context injection to run a shell script when the skill is loaded. It also makes extensive use of system CLI tools to modify the environment and interact with remote services.
- Evidence:
!${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/discover-config.shused for pre-resolved configuration. - Evidence: Use of
git pull,git push, andghCLI for repository and issue management. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill pulls code and metadata from external sources, including GitHub repositories and Trello APIs, to facilitate the sprint process.
- Evidence:
git pull origin "$default_branch"andgh issue list. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from external platforms and uses it to construct instructions for sub-agents.
- Ingestion points: GitHub Issue bodies (
gh issue list), Trello card descriptions (mcp__trello__get_cards_by_list_id), and local item files (.pm/items/). - Boundary markers: The skill looks for specific markdown headers like
## Acceptance Criteria, but does not implement strict delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands. - Capability inventory: The sub-agents are granted
Bash,Read,Write, andEdittools, allowing for significant filesystem and system impact if an injection is successful. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or escaping of the ingested issue/card content is performed before interpolation into sub-agent prompts.
Audit Metadata