triage
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes dynamic context injection syntax (
!) in Phase 0.0 to execute a vendor script (discover-config.sh) at load time. More significantly, in Phase 0.2, it usesevalto execute shell commands dynamically generated by the${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/for-each-board.shscript. Since the output of this script is influenced by Trello board metadata, executing the resulting string as code presents a command injection risk. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its handling of untrusted data from GitHub and Trello.
- Ingestion points: Item titles and descriptions are fetched from external backends in Phase 0.2.
- Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or specific instructions provided to the LLM to ignore potentially malicious content within the ingested item descriptions when they are passed to brainstorming and writing-plans skills.
- Capability inventory: The skill has permissions to read, write, and edit local files (via Bash), execute GitHub CLI commands, and interact with Trello boards.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of external content is performed before it is interpolated into prompts or used in automated evaluations.
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