ai-avatar-video

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted user data which is interpolated into shell commands, creating a potential attack surface.
  • Ingestion points: The skill accepts user-defined strings for voice_script, prompt, voice_prompt, and video_prompt within the belt app run commands (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack delimiters or explicit warnings to the agent to ignore embedded instructions in user data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the Bash tool to execute the belt CLI (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping of the user-provided scripts is demonstrated before being passed to the shell.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of an external CLI tool and references remote documentation.
  • Suggests installing the belt-sh/cli package via npx (SKILL.md).
  • References external installation instructions hosted at raw.githubusercontent.com/inference-sh/skills (SKILL.md).
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is configured to execute shell commands using the Bash tool scoped to the belt binary.
  • The allowed-tools frontmatter grants access to Bash(belt *), allowing the agent to run various subcommands of the belt utility (SKILL.md).
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 2, 2026, 02:24 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — ai-avatar-video