ai-avatar-video
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted user data which is interpolated into shell commands, creating a potential attack surface.
- Ingestion points: The skill accepts user-defined strings for
voice_script,prompt,voice_prompt, andvideo_promptwithin thebelt app runcommands (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions lack delimiters or explicit warnings to the agent to ignore embedded instructions in user data.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool to execute thebeltCLI (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping of the user-provided scripts is demonstrated before being passed to the shell.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of an external CLI tool and references remote documentation.
- Suggests installing the
belt-sh/clipackage vianpx(SKILL.md). - References external installation instructions hosted at
raw.githubusercontent.com/inference-sh/skills(SKILL.md). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is configured to execute shell commands using the
Bashtool scoped to thebeltbinary. - The
allowed-toolsfrontmatter grants access toBash(belt *), allowing the agent to run various subcommands of thebeltutility (SKILL.md).
Audit Metadata