competitor-teardown

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external sources, which is a vector for indirect prompt injection. \n
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via infsh/agent-browser (screenshots and scraping) and tavily/extract (web content) as described in SKILL.md. \n
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not define delimiters or instructions to ignore potential commands embedded in the retrieved web content. \n
  • Capability inventory: The agent has permissions to execute arbitrary Python code via infsh/python-executor and run shell commands via the Bash(belt *) tool. \n
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the external content is present in the provided instructions. \n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes a runtime environment to execute Python scripts for creating positioning maps. \n
  • It runs Python code that imports matplotlib to generate and save images. \n
  • While the script provided in SKILL.md uses a static template, this type of dynamic execution is a capability that requires monitoring. \n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill suggests installing several external components for its core functionality. \n
  • It directs users to install belt-sh/cli and additional skills from the inference-sh GitHub repository. \n
  • These downloads are associated with the infrastructure provider for the skill. \n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the belt CLI tool for all its major operations. \n
  • The Bash(belt *) permission enables the agent to execute research and analysis tasks via the belt command interface.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 2, 2026, 02:21 PM