competitor-teardown
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external sources, which is a vector for indirect prompt injection. \n
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via
infsh/agent-browser(screenshots and scraping) andtavily/extract(web content) as described in SKILL.md. \n - Boundary markers: The skill does not define delimiters or instructions to ignore potential commands embedded in the retrieved web content. \n
- Capability inventory: The agent has permissions to execute arbitrary Python code via
infsh/python-executorand run shell commands via theBash(belt *)tool. \n - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the external content is present in the provided instructions. \n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes a runtime environment to execute Python scripts for creating positioning maps. \n
- It runs Python code that imports
matplotlibto generate and save images. \n - While the script provided in SKILL.md uses a static template, this type of dynamic execution is a capability that requires monitoring. \n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill suggests installing several external components for its core functionality. \n
- It directs users to install
belt-sh/cliand additional skills from theinference-shGitHub repository. \n - These downloads are associated with the infrastructure provider for the skill. \n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the
beltCLI tool for all its major operations. \n - The
Bash(belt *)permission enables the agent to execute research and analysis tasks via thebeltcommand interface.
Audit Metadata