llm-models
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation provides instructions to install the
beltCLI tool and other platform-related skills usingnpx skills addcommands targeting thebelt-shandinference-shnamespaces. It also references installation scripts hosted onraw.githubusercontent.com. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the
Bashtool and specifically requests authorization to execute thebeltcommand viaallowed-tools: Bash(belt *). This follows the principle of least privilege by restricting shell access to a specific utility. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as a bridge for user-provided data to be processed by external Large Language Models (LLMs).
- Ingestion points: User-supplied strings are interpolated into JSON payloads passed to the
belt app runcommand inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill uses JSON structured objects (e.g.,
{"prompt": "..."}) to encapsulate user input, providing a basic structural boundary. - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool to execute thebeltCLI tool, which performs network operations to communicate with model inference servers. - Sanitization: No explicit client-side sanitization or filtering of the prompt content is described in the skill instructions; it relies on the safety filters of the destination LLMs.
Audit Metadata