skills/styleof/superpowers/llm-models/Gen Agent Trust Hub

llm-models

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation provides instructions to install the belt CLI tool and other platform-related skills using npx skills add commands targeting the belt-sh and inference-sh namespaces. It also references installation scripts hosted on raw.githubusercontent.com.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the Bash tool and specifically requests authorization to execute the belt command via allowed-tools: Bash(belt *). This follows the principle of least privilege by restricting shell access to a specific utility.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as a bridge for user-provided data to be processed by external Large Language Models (LLMs).
  • Ingestion points: User-supplied strings are interpolated into JSON payloads passed to the belt app run command in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The skill uses JSON structured objects (e.g., {"prompt": "..."}) to encapsulate user input, providing a basic structural boundary.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the Bash tool to execute the belt CLI tool, which performs network operations to communicate with model inference servers.
  • Sanitization: No explicit client-side sanitization or filtering of the prompt content is described in the skill instructions; it relies on the safety filters of the destination LLMs.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 2, 2026, 02:23 PM