improve-subimage-coverage
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive global configuration paths and executes commands that reveal identity and infrastructure details.
- Evidence: Checks for the existence of
~/.aws/configand~/.config/gcloud/configurations/to determine if cloud CLIs are configured. - Evidence: Executes
gh auth statusto retrieve GitHub authentication information. - Evidence: Executes
kubectl config get-contextsto list Kubernetes cluster information. - Evidence: Runs
git remote -vwhich reveals repository source URLs. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from the repository's source files, which could be manipulated to influence the audit summary or recommendations.
- Ingestion points: Reads
.tf(Terraform) files viagrepand inspectspackage.json,requirements.txt, andpyproject.tomlmanifests. - Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not use delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded content in the ingested data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to read local files, execute shell commands, and query external data via internal SubImage tools (
subimageListModules,subimageRunCypher). - Sanitization: Absent; there is no evidence of filtering or escaping the data extracted from the repository files.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes various shell commands to perform its auditing workflow.
- Evidence: Uses
grep,ls,kubectl,gh,git,awk, andsortto collect environment and repository signals. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides links to external resources for documentation and module configuration.
- Evidence: References and links to documentation on SubImage's official portal (
app.subimage.io).
Audit Metadata