improve-subimage-coverage

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive global configuration paths and executes commands that reveal identity and infrastructure details.
  • Evidence: Checks for the existence of ~/.aws/config and ~/.config/gcloud/configurations/ to determine if cloud CLIs are configured.
  • Evidence: Executes gh auth status to retrieve GitHub authentication information.
  • Evidence: Executes kubectl config get-contexts to list Kubernetes cluster information.
  • Evidence: Runs git remote -v which reveals repository source URLs.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from the repository's source files, which could be manipulated to influence the audit summary or recommendations.
  • Ingestion points: Reads .tf (Terraform) files via grep and inspects package.json, requirements.txt, and pyproject.toml manifests.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not use delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded content in the ingested data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to read local files, execute shell commands, and query external data via internal SubImage tools (subimageListModules, subimageRunCypher).
  • Sanitization: Absent; there is no evidence of filtering or escaping the data extracted from the repository files.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes various shell commands to perform its auditing workflow.
  • Evidence: Uses grep, ls, kubectl, gh, git, awk, and sort to collect environment and repository signals.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides links to external resources for documentation and module configuration.
  • Evidence: References and links to documentation on SubImage's official portal (app.subimage.io).
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 22, 2026, 11:39 PM