investigate-package
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow in
SKILL.md(Step 2) instructs the agent to use therg(ripgrep) shell command to search local manifests using user-provided<PACKAGE_NAME>and<PACKAGE_VERSION>variables. The templaterg -n '"<PACKAGE_NAME>"|<PACKAGE_NAME>@|<PACKAGE_VERSION>'does not include instructions for shell-safe escaping, which could allow a malicious user to perform command injection by providing inputs containing shell metacharacters. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the agent to dynamically construct Cypher queries by interpolating user-controlled values into predefined templates found in
references/cypher-templates.md. While the skill provides manual escaping logic (e.g., escaping single quotes and backslashes), this pattern of manual query assembly is a form of dynamic code generation. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process potentially untrusted data from external sources, including CVE metadata, issue tracker contents (
subimageGetIssue), and repository manifests. This data could be crafted by an attacker to include malicious instructions aimed at influencing the agent's logic or the parameters of the tools it executes. - Ingestion points: Data retrieved from
subimageGetIssue, query results fromsubimageRunCypher, and repository file contents searched viarg. - Boundary markers: None. The skill does not instruct the agent to use delimiters or specific ignore-instructions when handling data from these sources.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands (
rg) and database queries (subimageRunCypher). - Sanitization: Partial. While the skill includes escaping rules for Cypher literals, it lacks sanitization instructions for the shell command template used in the manifest search step.
Audit Metadata