visual-style
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides extractors that process untrusted data from external sources, presenting a surface for indirect injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: The agent fetches and parses content from arbitrary website URLs (
from-website.md), uploaded brand guide PDFs (from-pdf.md), and video keyframes (from-video.md) to generate design specifications. - Boundary markers: The instructions for extraction define the target fields but lack explicit warnings or delimiters to prevent the agent from following adversarial instructions that might be embedded in the source material.
- Capability inventory: The skill generates
visual-style.mdfiles containing prompts for other AI models, produces HTML/CSS for slides, and integrates with external video generation platforms (HeyGen) via MCP tools. - Sanitization: There is no documented mechanism to filter or sanitize the extracted content before it is interpolated into fields like
style_prompt_full, which are used to drive other tools. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The extraction workflow involves fetching content from user-provided URLs. While this is a functional requirement for the skill, it involves interaction with arbitrary external domains to retrieve HTML and CSS data for analysis.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates presentation content by creating HTML and CSS based on design system parameters (
html-slides.md). This involves template-based generation of executable web code using data extracted from potentially untrusted external sources.
Audit Metadata