visual-style

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides extractors that process untrusted data from external sources, presenting a surface for indirect injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: The agent fetches and parses content from arbitrary website URLs (from-website.md), uploaded brand guide PDFs (from-pdf.md), and video keyframes (from-video.md) to generate design specifications.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions for extraction define the target fields but lack explicit warnings or delimiters to prevent the agent from following adversarial instructions that might be embedded in the source material.
  • Capability inventory: The skill generates visual-style.md files containing prompts for other AI models, produces HTML/CSS for slides, and integrates with external video generation platforms (HeyGen) via MCP tools.
  • Sanitization: There is no documented mechanism to filter or sanitize the extracted content before it is interpolated into fields like style_prompt_full, which are used to drive other tools.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The extraction workflow involves fetching content from user-provided URLs. While this is a functional requirement for the skill, it involves interaction with arbitrary external domains to retrieve HTML and CSS data for analysis.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates presentation content by creating HTML and CSS based on design system parameters (html-slides.md). This involves template-based generation of executable web code using data extracted from potentially untrusted external sources.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 26, 2026, 06:31 PM