open-design

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 2, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads content from an external repository during setup and usage. It uses git clone to fetch the Open Design catalogue from https://github.com/nexu-io/open-design to the local directory ~/.open-design-skill/repo. It also offers to perform a git pull to update this content during project initialization.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill demonstrates remote content execution by instructing the agent to read and follow the logic contained within SKILL.md files from the cloned external repository. Phase 3 of the workflow specifically directs the agent to compose and execute the workflow defined in the downloaded SKILL.md bodies, effectively allowing the remote repository maintainer to control agent behavior.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the execution of several shell commands to manage its lifecycle and content. These include:
  • git clone https://github.com/nexu-io/open-design "$ROOT" to fetch external content.
  • git -C "$ROOT" pull --ff-only to update external content.
  • node "$SKILL_DIR/scripts/list-*.mjs" to execute local helper scripts that parse the downloaded content.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and follows instructions from an external source without boundary markers or sanitization. This is documented as follows:
  • Ingestion points: The agent reads SKILL.md and DESIGN.md files from the external ~/.open-design-skill/repo directory.
  • Boundary markers: There are no delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded malicious prompts within the external files.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands (via the skill's scripts), write files (artifacts) to the project directory, and perform network operations via git.
  • Sanitization: There is no validation or filtering of the external content before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 2, 2026, 03:41 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — open-design