impeccable
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 23, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill automates the execution of external AI agents (Claude and Codex) to apply code edits to the repository. In
live-copy-edit-agent.mjs, it explicitly utilizes the--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandboxflag for Codex and--permission-mode bypassPermissionsfor Claude, which circumvents standard security constraints during the code modification process. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through its data ingestion surface.
- Ingestion points:
live-browser.jsandlive-server.mjsextract DOM structure, text content, and screenshots from the user's active browser tab. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands were found in the prompt construction logic within
live-copy-edit-agent.mjsorcodex.md. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities, including writing to source files (
live-accept.mjs,live-wrap.mjs), modifying project configuration, and patching Content Security Policies (CSP). - Sanitization: External content from the browser is truncated but otherwise interpolated directly into prompts without robust escaping or filtering.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple scripts perform extensive file system operations and configuration changes.
live-inject.mjsandlive-wrap.mjsmodify project source files (HTML, JSX, TSX, Svelte, Astro), whilehook-admin.mjsandhook-lib.mjsmodify git configuration (.git/info/exclude) and project-local config files. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The local helper server started by
live-server.mjssetsAccess-Control-Allow-Originto*. While the server is bound to the loopback interface, this configuration increases the risk of cross-site interaction if local ports are identified by malicious external websites.
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