antigravity-image-gen
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill reads the agent's global authentication configuration file located at
/home/ubuntu/.clawdbot/agents/main/agent/auth-profiles.json. This file contains sensitive OAuth access and refresh tokens for the agent's identity. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The script extracts OAuth access tokens from the local configuration and transmits them to a remote endpoint (
daily-cloudcode-pa.sandbox.googleapis.com). While the destination domain belongs to a trusted organization, the extraction of the agent's primary identity tokens for use in an external sandbox API represents a significant data exfiltration risk. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user input via the
--promptargument and interpolates it directly into the model request payload without sufficient isolation. - Ingestion points: The
generate.jsscript accepts untrusted text via the--promptcommand-line argument. - Boundary markers: The prompt is embedded within a JSON structure without explicit delimiters or instructions to the model to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file system access (read/write) and network communication capabilities.
- Sanitization: No validation or escaping is performed on the user-supplied prompt string.
- [BYPASS_BEHAVIOR]: The script uses forged
User-AgentandX-Goog-Api-Clientheaders to impersonate the VS Code Cloud Shell Editor and Google Cloud SDK. This is used to access an internal sandbox API endpoint (v1internal:streamGenerateContent) that is not intended for standard public usage.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata