nano-banana-antigravity

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 29, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The script scripts/generate_image.py contains a hardcoded OAuth client secret.
  • Evidence: ANTIGRAVITY_CLIENT_SECRET = "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" in scripts/generate_image.py.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill scans the local filesystem for sensitive authentication files belonging to the 'OpenClaw' and 'OpenCode' applications to harvest OAuth refresh tokens.
  • Evidence: find_all_antigravity_credentials function in scripts/generate_image.py attempts to read from:
  • ~/.openclaw/agents/main/agent/auth-profiles.json
  • ~/.openclaw/auth-profiles.json
  • ~/.openclaw/credentials/google-antigravity.json
  • ~/.config/opencode/antigravity-accounts.json
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill communicates with official Google OAuth and CloudCode API endpoints to refresh tokens and generate image content.
  • Evidence: Requests are made to oauth2.googleapis.com and cloudcode-pa.googleapis.com.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it interpolates user-provided prompts directly into requests sent to a remote image generation model without sanitization.
  • Ingestion points: User-provided --prompt argument in scripts/generate_image.py (line 332).
  • Boundary markers: None present in the API payload construction.
  • Capability inventory: Network access via requests and file system writes via pathlib (line 392).
  • Sanitization: No input validation or escaping is performed on the prompt string.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Jul 29, 2026, 03:30 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — nano-banana-antigravity