nano-banana-antigravity
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 29, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The script
scripts/generate_image.pycontains a hardcoded OAuth client secret. - Evidence:
ANTIGRAVITY_CLIENT_SECRET = "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"inscripts/generate_image.py. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill scans the local filesystem for sensitive authentication files belonging to the 'OpenClaw' and 'OpenCode' applications to harvest OAuth refresh tokens.
- Evidence:
find_all_antigravity_credentialsfunction inscripts/generate_image.pyattempts to read from: ~/.openclaw/agents/main/agent/auth-profiles.json~/.openclaw/auth-profiles.json~/.openclaw/credentials/google-antigravity.json~/.config/opencode/antigravity-accounts.json- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill communicates with official Google OAuth and CloudCode API endpoints to refresh tokens and generate image content.
- Evidence: Requests are made to
oauth2.googleapis.comandcloudcode-pa.googleapis.com. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it interpolates user-provided prompts directly into requests sent to a remote image generation model without sanitization.
- Ingestion points: User-provided
--promptargument inscripts/generate_image.py(line 332). - Boundary markers: None present in the API payload construction.
- Capability inventory: Network access via
requestsand file system writes viapathlib(line 392). - Sanitization: No input validation or escaping is performed on the prompt string.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata