plaid
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to download and install an external binary from a third-party GitHub repository (
github.com/jverdi/plaid-cli@0.0.2) using thego installcommand. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
go installto fetch and execute code from an unverifiable external source at runtime. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses and manages highly sensitive financial data, including
PLAID_CLIENT_ID,PLAID_SECRET, and access tokens. It specifically references sensitive local files and directories such as~/.plaid-cli/config.tomland~/.plaid-cliwhere these credentials and tokens are stored. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on extensive shell command execution, including piping output through utilities like
jq,sort,comm, andmvfor processing financial data. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill suggests establishing persistence on the host system by using
cronto schedule recurring transaction monitoring scripts. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
- Ingestion points: The skill retrieves transaction data from external banking institutions via the Plaid API (
plaid-cli transactions). - Boundary markers: There are no instructions provided to the agent to treat transaction data as untrusted or to ignore instructions that might be embedded in transaction names or descriptions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands and file system operations based on the processed transaction data.
- Sanitization: The skill does not implement sanitization or validation of the data retrieved from the external API before processing it with shell utilities.
Audit Metadata