remotion-video-toolkit
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to build dynamic video rendering pipelines that ingest external data, creating a potential attack surface.
- Ingestion points: In
rules/calculate-metadata.md, thecalculateMetadatafunction is shown fetching data fromprops.dataUrl. Inrules/rendering.md, an Express server pattern usesreq.bodydirectly to define composition properties. - Boundary markers: The code examples do not demonstrate the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions for data incorporated into the rendering context.
- Capability inventory: The skill leverages powerful capabilities including local rendering via Node.js/CLI, and deployment/execution on AWS Lambda and Google Cloud Run.
- Sanitization: No input validation, escaping, or sanitization logic is provided for external data before it is passed to the Remotion bundler or renderer.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches documentation and instructions from
remotion.devand retrieves animation assets fromlottiefiles.com. These are well-known services relevant to the skill's primary purpose and are documented neutrally. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes instructions for common developer operations such as scaffolding projects with
create-video, rendering via the Remotion CLI, and managing serverless deployments for video processing.
Audit Metadata