brief
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 4, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/install-schedule.shestablishes a persistence mechanism by creating a macOS LaunchAgent at~/Library/LaunchAgents/jp.theplant.felix.daily-work-brief.plistto schedule the morning brief task. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/prep.shscript invokes the agent using the--permission-mode bypassPermissionsflag, which allows for unattended execution by suppressing user confirmation prompts for tool usage. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection by processing external data from multiple communication platforms.
- Ingestion points: The
scripts/gather.shscript fetches raw data, including comments and message threads, from Jira, Slack, and GitHub. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to ignore or isolate instructions that may be embedded within the ingested external data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has write access to external platforms via
scripts/send.sh(Jira and GitHub comments) and can modify the system clipboard usingpbcopyfor Slack replies. - Sanitization: The skill does not perform any validation or sanitization of the gathered content before using it to generate drafted responses in the user's name.
Audit Metadata