relay-dispatch
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically constructs and executes Node.js code at runtime. In
scripts/recover.js, theexternalMergeObserverfunction generates a Node.js script as a string and executes it viaprocess.execPath -eto perform PR observations in an isolated context.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies heavily on executing external binaries and shell commands. It frequently invokesgitandghCLIs to manage repository state and PR lifecycle. It launches multiple external executor binaries (e.g.,agy,claude,pi,agent,cline) as part of its core dispatch functionality. It manages process containment using an inherited scope marker (RELAY_PROCESS_SCOPE) to track and clean up child processes.\n- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill performs sensitive authentication operations on the host.scripts/recover.jsincludes theresolveGithubObserverTokenfunction, which callsgh auth tokento obtain the operator's GitHub credentials for PR revalidation.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection. (1) Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the--promptand--prompt-fileflags inscripts/dispatch.js, as well as via files copied into the worktree using the--copyoption. (2) Boundary markers: The skill employs operational boundary markers such as[RELAY WORKTREE BOUNDARY]inscripts/adapters/antigravity.jsandscripts/adapters/cline.js. (3) Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities, including executing arbitrary commands viaspawnandexecFileSyncacross multiple scripts likescripts/host.jsandscripts/exec.js. (4) Sanitization: The skill includes path-traversal checks using thecontainedandcanonicalPathPrefixfunctions inscripts/run-store.js, but it does not perform semantic sanitization of all interpolated content.
Audit Metadata