pr-objectively

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill retrieves data from GitHub pull request history and local templates to guide the generation of new PR content. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection if existing PRs contain instructions intended to override agent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: scripts/ctx.sh and scripts/ctx.cmd fetch the title and body of recent pull requests using gh pr list and read .github/pull_request_template.md from the repository.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or warnings for the agent to treat ingested PR content as data rather than instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes gh pr create to make changes to the remote repository and xdg-open, open, or start to interact with the host operating system.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization is applied to the PR bodies or titles retrieved from the GitHub API before they are processed by the agent.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on several shell commands to function, including git for diffing and branch information, the GitHub CLI (gh) for label and PR management, and platform-specific commands like start, notepad, open, or xdg-open to present generated content to the user for review.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 7, 2026, 12:09 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — pr-objectively