pr-objectively
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill retrieves data from GitHub pull request history and local templates to guide the generation of new PR content. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection if existing PRs contain instructions intended to override agent behavior.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/ctx.shandscripts/ctx.cmdfetch thetitleandbodyof recent pull requests usinggh pr listand read.github/pull_request_template.mdfrom the repository. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or warnings for the agent to treat ingested PR content as data rather than instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
gh pr createto make changes to the remote repository andxdg-open,open, orstartto interact with the host operating system. - Sanitization: No sanitization is applied to the PR bodies or titles retrieved from the GitHub API before they are processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on several shell commands to function, including
gitfor diffing and branch information, the GitHub CLI (gh) for label and PR management, and platform-specific commands likestart,notepad,open, orxdg-opento present generated content to the user for review.
Audit Metadata