worktree-pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple local bash scripts (
ghchk,wtinit,wtadd,wcp,wtcmt,wtpush,wtpr,wtciwait,wtstep) to automate complex git and GitHub CLI workflows. While these are essential to the skill's function, they represent a significant execution surface. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection during Step 4 (Committing) and Step 6 (Creating Pull Request).
- Ingestion points: The agent reads full file diffs via
git diff <start-branch>...HEADand the user's original request string. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or instructions used when reading code changes to prevent the LLM from obeying instructions embedded in code comments or strings.
- Capability inventory: The agent can write persistent data to the repository via
wtcmt(commits) andwtpr(PR creation), and push those changes to a remote server viawtpush. - Sanitization: None. The agent is instructed to produce an objective representation of the diff, which could be manipulated by adversarial content within the diff itself.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
wtpushscript temporarily modifies the repository'soriginremote URL to an SSH format to facilitate pushing in different environments. Although it uses atrapto restore the original URL upon exit or interruption, this behavior modifies the repository's global configuration during the operation.
Audit Metadata