search1api
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICALREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions to install the
s1CLI by piping a remote script directly into the shell (curl -fsSL https://cli.search1api.com/install.sh | bash), which allows for unverified code execution from an external source. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches content and executable code from several external sources, including the
cli.search1api.comdomain and the npm registry. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's entire functionality relies on executing shell commands via the
s1tool andnpx, which involves high-level interaction with the operating system. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
s1 learncommand dynamically generates and installs new AI agent skills into local directories (~/.agents/skills/or./.agents/skills/), which effectively creates new executable content at runtime based on external data. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process arbitrary data from search results and web pages, creating a significant vulnerability to instructions hidden in external content.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context from
s1 search,s1 crawl, ands1 learnas defined inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions to disregard embedded commands are present in the processing logic.
- Capability inventory: The agent can execute shell commands and modify the local file system by installing new skills, as shown in
SKILL.md. - Sanitization: There is no documented logic for sanitizing or escaping the content retrieved from external URLs before it is processed by the agent.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://cli.search1api.com/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata