morning-briefing
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources, specifically email threads and calendar events, via the Superhuman Mail MCP server. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, where malicious instructions hidden in an email could attempt to influence the agent's behavior during the summarization or triage process.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(calls toSuperhuman_Mail.list_threadsandSuperhuman_Mail.query_email_and_calendar). - Boundary markers: The skill does not define explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the processed email content.
- Capability inventory:
SKILL.mdincludes capabilities to draft replies (Superhuman_Mail.create_or_update_draft) and archive threads (Superhuman_Mail.update_thread). - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of email body content is defined in the instructions.
Audit Metadata