superset-orchestrate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
supersetCLI to manage hosts, agents, workspaces, and terminals. It also usesbunandbunxfor development tasks within the Superset monorepo. These are standard operations for the tool's intended purpose.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The instruction to runsuperset updateallows for downloading updates to the CLI tool. These actions target the vendor's own services.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The use ofbunx cli-framework devinvolves fetching and executing developer tooling from an external registry. This is a common practice in development environments for exercising source code against configured APIs.\n- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill references.envfiles for configuration and authentication (superset auth whoami). This is a standard practice for managing secrets in local development environments and is not used for exfiltration to unauthorized parties.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because the coordinator agent reads output from worker agents (superset terminals read). If a worker agent's output contains malicious instructions, they could influence the coordinator.\n - Ingestion points: Terminal output is ingested via the
superset terminals readcommand inSKILL.md.\n - Boundary markers: The skill defines specific protocol envelopes (
SUPERSET_WORKER_DONE,SUPERSET_WORKER_BLOCKED) to mark the end of worker tasks, which serves as a basic boundary mechanism.\n - Capability inventory: The coordinator can execute commands, create agents, and send text to existing sessions.\n
- Sanitization: No automated sanitization is described; the skill relies on the coordinator agent to 'independently verify risky or overlapping changes' and inspect snapshots for malformed envelopes.
Audit Metadata