supsub-group

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 30, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The documentation includes a command to download and execute a script directly from the vendor's GitHub repository: curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/SupSub-AI/supsub-cli/master/scripts/install.sh | bash. This represents remote code execution triggered during the setup process.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Recommends installing the @supsub/cli package from public registries using npm or pnpm to provide the necessary tooling for the skill.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's core functionality relies on executing shell commands through the supsub CLI to manage groups and list subscription sources.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data from the SupSub API, such as group names and source descriptions, creating an indirect prompt injection surface (Category 8).
  • Ingestion points: Metadata retrieved by supsub group list and supsub group subs as described in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit boundary markers or instructions to the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the processed data.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute shell commands via the supsub CLI.
  • Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any sanitization or validation logic for the data retrieved from the API before it is processed by the agent.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/SupSub-AI/supsub-cli/master/scripts/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Jul 30, 2026, 01:15 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — supsub-group