team-lead
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill recommends installing a third-party extension from an untrusted GitHub repository to enable specific messaging capabilities between different agent harnesses.
- Evidence: Step 3 of the 'Harness setup' in
SKILL.mdsuggests runningpi install git:github.com/alonw0/pi-claude-linkif the extension is missing from the user's environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill manages a multi-agent workflow that processes external task descriptions, creating a surface for indirect injection attacks where malicious task content could influence the leader or sub-agents.
- Ingestion points: Ingests task data from issue trackers and user messages as defined in 'Workflow' step 1 of
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: While the skill uses a structured briefing template, it lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the external task content.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes powerful tools including shell execution, remote terminal management (
orca,herdr), and remote file system access viassh(e.g., inretire-agent.sh). - Sanitization: Employs
printf %qfor shell argument escaping andjqfor JSON manipulation, which provides significant protection against direct command injection during orchestration. - [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The skill uses platform-specific syntax to execute shell commands at load time to display its own configuration to the agent.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdcontains the pattern!cat "${XDG_CONFIG_HOME:-$HOME/.config}/hyper/team-lead/harnesses.yaml" ...which executes to load existing harness settings when the skill is loaded by the agent harness.
Audit Metadata