skills/svallory/tutor/team-lead/Gen Agent Trust Hub

team-lead

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill recommends installing a third-party extension from an untrusted GitHub repository to enable specific messaging capabilities between different agent harnesses.
  • Evidence: Step 3 of the 'Harness setup' in SKILL.md suggests running pi install git:github.com/alonw0/pi-claude-link if the extension is missing from the user's environment.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill manages a multi-agent workflow that processes external task descriptions, creating a surface for indirect injection attacks where malicious task content could influence the leader or sub-agents.
  • Ingestion points: Ingests task data from issue trackers and user messages as defined in 'Workflow' step 1 of SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: While the skill uses a structured briefing template, it lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the external task content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes powerful tools including shell execution, remote terminal management (orca, herdr), and remote file system access via ssh (e.g., in retire-agent.sh).
  • Sanitization: Employs printf %q for shell argument escaping and jq for JSON manipulation, which provides significant protection against direct command injection during orchestration.
  • [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The skill uses platform-specific syntax to execute shell commands at load time to display its own configuration to the agent.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md contains the pattern !cat "${XDG_CONFIG_HOME:-$HOME/.config}/hyper/team-lead/harnesses.yaml" ... which executes to load existing harness settings when the skill is loaded by the agent harness.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 13, 2026, 10:16 PM