genai-tk
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 28, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill directs users to install the
genai-tktoolkit from a third-party GitHub repository (https://github.com/tclatos/genai-tk@main) rather than a verified package registry. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The toolkit includes support for
SmolAgentsand apython_repltool that allow for the generation and execution of Python code. Although Docker isolation is recommended, the toolkit permits 'local' execution in the host process. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The CLI system (
genai-tk.main.cli) uses dynamic imports to load command classes defined in YAML configuration files, which allows for arbitrary code loading if the configuration is modified. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The system manages sensitive API keys for LLM providers in
.envfiles. Agents withfilesystem_toolsaccess can read these files, and when paired with network-capable tools likeweb_searchorbrowser_use, this creates a risk of data exfiltration. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted data from web searches and local documents. The mandatory evidence chain includes:
- Ingestion points: External data enters through RAG ingestion (
rag add-files) and agent tools likeweb_searchandbrowser_use. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to distinguish between system instructions and retrieved data content.
- Capability inventory: The toolkit enables subprocess execution, Python REPL usage, filesystem access, and network requests.
- Sanitization: No content sanitization or instruction filtering is implemented for data retrieved from external sources.
Audit Metadata