build-list
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill exhibits self-modifying behavior by using
swan-update-skillto dynamically rewrite its own 'Setup state' instructions inSKILL.mdafter the initial configuration is completed. This changes the agent's operating logic for future executions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes
swan-execute-codeto handle data processing tasks, such as domain deduplication and hard re-filtering, specifically when handling batches larger than 50 rows. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection via its research sub-agents which are instructed to visit and extract data from external domains.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data is ingested when
swan-delegate-to-sub-agentsvisits external websites ({domain}) and whenswan-fetch-businessesretrieves data from external providers like Apollo or Apify. - Boundary markers: The sub-agent prompt template uses basic instruction-based delimitation but lacks robust escaping or 'ignore' directives for the interpolated external content.
- Capability inventory: The skill environment includes tools for arbitrary code execution (
swan-execute-code) and instruction modification (swan-update-skill). - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization, validation, or content filtering is described for the data retrieved from external domains before it is used to drive sub-agent decisions or code-based data processing.
Audit Metadata