cua

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 6, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the ingestion of untrusted data from the open web, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection attacks where malicious content on a webpage could attempt to influence agent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Web content retrieved via browser_get_text and browser_get_html tools as described in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or guidelines for the agent to separate fetched content from its internal instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill includes active interaction tools (browser_click, browser_fill) and navigation tools (browser_navigate) which could be targeted by injected instructions.
  • Sanitization: No explicit content sanitization or filtering logic is defined within the skill instructions.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The browser is configured to allow access to localhost. While a standard browser feature, this provides a pathway for the agent to interact with local services, which could lead to unintended data exposure if the agent is successfully manipulated by external content or malicious prompts.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 6, 2026, 09:31 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — cua