vllm-studio

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [Data Exposure & Exfiltration] (HIGH): The file references/deployment.md contains instructions for using a specific private SSH key path: ~/.ssh/linux-ai. Referencing or accessing sensitive identity files is a high-risk activity.
  • [Credential Safety] (HIGH): The file references/env-and-keys.md details the management of several sensitive credentials, including LITELLM_MASTER_KEY, EXA_API_KEY, and VLLM_STUDIO_API_KEY. While described as setup steps, providing instructions for secret management within an agent's context increases the risk of accidental exposure.
  • [Command Execution] (MEDIUM): The skill documentation (references/deployment.md) instructs the user or agent to execute ./start.sh and perform process management (pkill). Executing unverified local scripts allows for arbitrary code execution on the host machine.
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (LOW): The skill defines a surface for processing external data through the /chat UI and tool-call prompts.
  • Ingestion points: /chat UI (mentioned in references/deployment.md).
  • Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to the agent to treat external inputs as untrusted.
  • Capability inventory: Shell script execution (./start.sh), SSH connection (ssh), and Docker service management.
  • Sanitization: Absent; no sanitization or validation of the input used in tool calls is described.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 06:28 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — vllm-studio