syncfusion-blazor-inputs
Audited by Socket on Sep 16, 2026
4 alerts found:
Securityx2Anomalyx2The code is not indicative of malware or intentional supply-chain sabotage. It is documentation containing insecure file-upload examples. The direct use of client-controlled file names in write and delete paths is the most serious issue and should be corrected before production use with canonical path validation or generated filenames, authorization, upload limits, content validation, and storage outside the public web root.
The fragment contains no clear malicious behavior or supply-chain backdoor. It is ordinary upload documentation and sample code. The principal security concerns are implementation weaknesses: insufficient server-side validation and authorization, unsafe append-based chunk handling, filename collisions, possible data corruption, unbounded in-memory processing, and disclosure of raw exception messages. These issues require review before production deployment, but the code does not indicate malware.
The code is benign instructional documentation with no evidence of malware or supply-chain abuse. The main security issue is the unsafe MarkupString preview: user-controlled sharedContent is converted to raw HTML without encoding, creating a potential cross-site scripting risk. The timer and console logging examples present lower-severity reliability and privacy concerns.
The code is ordinary file-upload example/documentation code and shows no credible malware, credential theft, backdoor, or suspicious exfiltration behavior. The Remove handler is insecure because it uses an untrusted file name directly in a deletion path; it should canonicalize and constrain the path beneath the intended upload directory, reject traversal and rooted paths, use generated server-side identifiers, and enforce authorization. The shown code should not be deployed unchanged.