syncfusion-javascript-powerpoint
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the ingestion and processing of external PowerPoint (.pptx) files from untrusted sources such as user uploads, local disk, and remote URLs, which introduces a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: The
Presentation.open(data)method documented inreferences/loading-and-saving.mdis designed to process external binary data. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or specific instructions for the agent to ignore content-based instructions are provided in the documentation.
- Capability inventory: The skill demonstrates capabilities for file reading (
fs.readFileSync), file writing (fs/promises.writeFile), and network fetching (fetch). - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitization or structural validation for the content within the PowerPoint files.
- [METADATA_POISONING]: The file
references/loading-and-saving.mdcontains extraneous text that appears to be internal logs from a development tool, including a specific local file path (file:///d:/FeatureAnalysis/...) from the developer's environment. While likely an accidental artifact of the documentation process, it constitutes an information leak and a failure of metadata integrity.
Audit Metadata