syncfusion-maui-maps
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill integrates with multiple external map tile providers and data sources to render maps.
- Evidence: Downloads GeoJSON data from
cdn.syncfusion.comand fetches map tiles fromtile.openstreetmap.org,dev.virtualearth.net(Bing Maps), andapi.tomtom.com. - Context: These are well-known technology services and official vendor repositories used for the primary functionality of the map control.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The AI-driven location search implementation sends user-entered text to an external endpoint.
- Evidence: In
references/ai-location-search.md, theSfAutocomplete.Textvalue is passed to theGetResultsFromAImethod, which sends a request to an Azure OpenAI endpoint (openai.azure.com). - Context: This is a functional requirement for the AI search feature and targets a well-known cloud service provider.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection through its AI-powered location search feature.
- Ingestion points: User queries are captured via the
SfAutocompletecontrol inreferences/ai-location-search.mdand included in an LLM prompt. - Boundary markers: The implementation uses specific prompt instructions to guide the model (e.g., "retrieve minimum 5 to 6 entries", "The return format should be the following JSON format"), but lacks strictly enforced data delimiters.
- Capability inventory: The AI response is parsed to populate
CustomMarkerobjects which are displayed on the map. This involves setting coordinates and metadata but does not include executing code or writing to the file system. - Sanitization: The code includes coordinate validation in
StringToDoubleConverterand range checks (Latitude < -90 || Latitude > 90) to ensure data integrity during parsing.
Audit Metadata